Preventing cross-protocol attacks on the TLS protocol
draft-mavrogiannopoulos-tls-cross-protocol-03

Abstract

This memo proposes a fix in the TLS key exchange signature generation to prevent cross-protocol attacks.

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1. Introduction

The TLS protocol [RFC5246] suffers from an issue in the ServerKeyExchange message signature discovered by Wagner and Schneier in [WS-ATTACK]. They describe a cross-protocol attack on the SSL 3.0 [RFC6101] protocol, that re-uses a signed ServerKeyExchange packet in another session with a different key exchange algorithm. In effect the attack uses a server as an oracle to obtain signed ServerKeyExchange messages that are relayed to another, unrelated, session. The described attack turned to be impossible to implement in practice, but the underlying idea is applicable to all TLS protocol versions, and it provides a tool for new attacks on the protocol. The [CROSS-PROTOCOL] attack is a prominent example, which takes advantage of interactions between the Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman ciphersuites to perform a TLS server impersonation after obtaining $2^{40}$ signed messages.

In this document we propose a fix for the TLS protocol which makes it immune to these attacks, but does not require a protocol version upgrade.

2. Terminology

This document uses the same notation and terminology used in the TLS Protocol specification [RFC5246].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. The new ServerKeyExchange signature

The goal of this memo is to restrict the applicability of the server provided signed ServerKeyExchange to the current session. A simple fix may be to include the negotiated ciphersuite into the signature. However, the TLS protocol is complex and a key exchange method does not always imply a single format of the ServerKeyExchange signature. For example, the elliptic curves key exchange method may be used with an arbitrary elliptic curve [RFC4492] which requires different data in the ServerKeyExchange than when used with a named curve. Such key exchange suboptions are negotiated using TLS extensions and such extensions should be covered by the signature to prevent any attack that takes advantage of the different signature format.

For that we propose that the signature of the ServerKeyExchange message to be modified to include in addition to explicit identifiers of the algorithms, all the previously exchanged messages. The proposed signature for a ServerKeyExchange message is shown below.
enum { server (0), client (1) } ConnectionEnd;

enum { dhe_dss (0), dhe_rsa (1),
        ec_diffie_hellman (2) } KeyExchangeAlgorithm;

struct {
    KeyExchangeAlgorithm kx_algorithm;
    select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
        case dhe_dss: 
            case dhe_rsa: 
                ServerDHParams params; 
                ServerDHParams params; 
            case ec_diffie_hellman: 
                ServerECDHParams; 
                ServerECDHParams; 
    }
} Parameters;

struct {
    Parameters params;
    digitally-signed struct {
        ConnectionEnd entity;
        Parameters params;
        opaque handshake_messages<0..2^24-1>;
    }
} ServerKeyExchange;

The new format includes explicit indicators of the entity (server),
the key exchange algorithm used, the parameters of the key exchange,
and the previously exchanged handshake messages. This modification
will be negotiated by using a new TLS extension to allow backwards
compatibility.

4. The extension

In order for a client to advertise its support for the new
ServerKeyExchange format we add a new extension
"new_server_key_exchange", with value TBD-BY-IANA, to the enumerated
ExtensionType defined in [RFC5246]. The "extension_data" field of
this extension is empty.

5. Server and client behavior

Clients, that wish to protect against cross-protocol attacks, SHOULD
include the extension of type "new_server_key_exchange" in the
(extended) client hello.

Servers that receive an extended client hello containing a
"new_server_key_exchange" extension, MAY accept the request for the
new ServerKeyExchange format by including an extension of type
"new_server_key_exchange" in the extended server hello.

Servers compliant to this document, that did not receive the
extension MUST set the gmt_unix_time part of the Random value
included in ServerHello to zero. Because in cross-protocol attacks
the server’s random value is redirected to the client, this is a way
for the server to indicate support for the extension even in the
presence of an adversary.

Clients compliant to this document, that advertised this extension
but didn’t receive a corresponding extension from the server, MUST
check the gmt_unix_time part of the Random value included in
ServerHello message for the value zero. If the gmt_unix_time is zero
the client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" fatal
alert.

Note that this extension is applies to all versions of the TLS
protocol including TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and SSL 3.0 [RFC6101].

6. Security considerations

This extension modifies the ServerKeyExchange message in order to
prevent attacks to the protocol similar in nature with the Wagner and
Schneier attack. In order for the protection to be applicable, both
the client and the server must support this extension.

Compliant servers that did not receive the extension from the client
are required to set the 4 bytes of the server’s random value, that
encodes the time, as zero. This provides a tool to indicate support
for the extended format even in the presence of an adversary, but
comes at the cost of reducing the total randomness from the server
from 32 bytes to 28 bytes.

7. IANA Considerations

This document defines the TLS extension "new_server_key_exchange"
(value TBD-BY-IANA) whose value should be assigned from the TLS
ExtensionType Registry defined in [RFC5246].

8. References

8.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate

8.2. Informative References


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